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Abstract 
Firms face an optimization problem that requires a maximal quantity output given 
a quality constraint. How firms should incentivize quantity and quality to meet 
these dual goals remains an open question, potentially due to limitations of field 
data. We provide a theoretical model and conduct an experiment in which 
participants are paid for both quantity and quality of a real effort task. Consistent 
with the theoretical predictions, higher quality incentives encourage participants to 
shift their attention from quantity to quality, and higher quality incentives reduce 
inefficient decision-making. We also observe behavioral components in 
responsiveness to the quality incentive. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
JEL Classifications: D24, J24, J31, J41 
Keywords: quantity, quality, experiment, incentives, real effort, loss aversion 
 
* Corresponding author: Roman Sheremeta, rshereme@gmail.com 
We want to thank Kevin Guo, Christa Gibbs, Kathryn Carroll and students at the Behavioral and Experimental 
Economics Research Group for excellent research assistance. Any remaining errors are ours. 
  
1 
 
1. Introduction 
Firms face a quantity-quality output tradeoff. For instance, an orchard owner wants to incentivize 
her workers to pick as many apples as possible, but if workers are paid only based on the number 
of apples they pick, they may be careless and bruise much of the crop. Yet if the owner rewards 
workers solely based on the number of non-bruised apples picked, much of the orchard may remain 
unpicked. Understanding how workers respond to such quantity-quality tradeoffs is essential for 
understanding the conditions under which different wage schemes are efficient. 
How to incentivize workers is a question fundamental to economics, and an active literature 
exists on the effect of different incentive compensation schemes on worker effort.1 Worker 
productivity and quantity of output has been a focus of theoretical and empirical economic research 
for decades (Laffont and Martimort, 2009; Syverson, 2011). Some important works also consider 
the quality side of the tradeoff. Holmstrom and Milgrom (1991) and Baker (1992) lay out seminal 
principal-agent models that incorporate the multi-dimensional aspects of work incentives, and 
explain why incentivizing quantity may cause agents to ignore the quality of their output. 
However, to the best of our knowledge, an empirical investigation of how workers respond to 
different quantity-quality incentives is missing from the literature. 
Recent work has begun to investigate the optimal incentive contracts for workers in 
situations when the firm cares about multiple dimensions of worker output. A series of papers have 
used existing data or field experiments to investigate the relative merits of flat rate versus piece 
rate incentive schemes in the workplace (Lazear, 2000; Paarsch and Shearer, 2000; Shearer, 2004; 
                                                 
1 For instance, economists have used behavioral economics theories of gift exchange and framing to induce greater 
productivity of workers in a field setting (see Gneezy and List, 2006 for gift exchange, and Hossain and List, 2012 on 
framing). Other notable papers include the merits of competitive or piece rate incentive schemes, including the gender 
gap in competitiveness (Gneezy et al., 2003), and various profit-sharing compensation schemes (Nalbantian and 
Schotter, 1997). While many of these papers have incorporated quality considerations into their work, none of them 
have evaluated quality of output directly.  
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Copeland and Monnet, 2009; Ederer and Manso, 2013; Al-Ubaydli et al., 2015).2 The above papers 
find a positive impact of piece rates on quantity of output, but the evidence is mixed for its impact 
on quality. For instance, Al-Ubaydli et al. (2015) find increases in quality, while Johnson et al. 
(2015) and Ederer and Manso (2013) find decreases in quality from pay-for performance 
compensation. Confounds in the field may explain these disparate results – for example, Al-
Ubaydli et al. (2015) note that workers may have uncertainty about the observability of the quality 
of output. 
We overcome the confounds inherent in field data by designing a laboratory experiment 
aimed at investigating the trade-offs of incentivizing quantity and quality in worker effort. The 
laboratory environment gives us control over problems that exist in the field, such as difficulty in 
monitoring quality of output and the effects of selection from workers moving in and out of the 
firm in response to changes in their compensation package. In addition, while the existing literature 
examines how different contracts (e.g., pay-for-performance or fixed wage) affect quantity or 
quality, none of these address the quantity-quality tradeoffs directly. 
Importantly, our results broaden our understanding of incentivizing the multiple 
dimensions of productivity. Consider the following example. The firm hires a worker to produce 
a certain product (as in our introductory example). If the worker’s payment depends only on 
quantity of units produced, she may choose to put all of her effort in maximizing quantity, while 
ignoring the quality of the production, as predicted by the theoretical models of Holmstrom and 
Milgrom (1991) and Baker (1992). On the other hand, if the worker’s payment depends mainly on 
                                                 
2 Additional related work includes Eriksson et al. (2009) who use a real-effort experiment to examine how feedback 
about performance of others impacts quantity and quality under pay-for-performance and tournament payment 
schemes, Charness and Grieco (2014) who investigate the impact of incentives on creativity, and Bracha and 
Fershtman (2013) who study how competitive incentive schemes affect the combination of cognitive and labor efforts 
provided by workers. 
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quality of units produced, she may choose to put too much effort in maintaining high quality, while 
producing low quantity (an example of such a setup would be workers paid mostly on commission 
from successful endeavors). The optimal compensation scheme should involve a balance between 
rewarding quantity and quality, although the optimal tradeoff depends on how important quality 
considerations are in the market for the final product. 
In this study, we examine how individuals respond to different incentives in the quantity-
quality context. How do quality incentives impact productivity? Does incentivizing quality 
increase the quality of output? Does the quantity-quality tradeoff differ by the characteristics of 
the agent (e.g., ability, risk aversion, loss aversion, and overconfidence)? What type of labor 
contracts should employers offer workers given the conditions faced by the employers? The 
theoretical model we outline provides insights into the answers to these questions, while the 
experiment we conduct provides empirical evidence. In our experiment, individuals solve math 
problems and their output quantity (number of problems attempted) and quality (number of 
problems answered correctly) is measured when (i) only quantity is incentivized, (ii) some quality 
is incentivized, and (iii) the bulk of the incentives are on quality. 
We find that, consistent with the theoretical predictions, higher quality incentives 
encourage participants to shift their attention from quantity to quality by increasing quality of 
output and decreasing the number of problems answered incorrectly at the expense of lowering 
quantity of output. We also find that higher quality incentives encourage participants to make 
better quantity-quality trade-offs, reducing inefficient decision-making. Moreover, we find that, 
consistent with the theoretical predictions, higher ability participants choose to focus more on 
quality and have lower error rates (i.e., number incorrect/number attempted). Based on these 
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findings, we discuss what the potential implications are for the optimal type of labor contracts that 
employers should offer workers. 
We also observe a behavioral component in responsiveness to the quality incentive. There 
is heterogeneity in the impact of treatment, with more loss-averse participants displaying greater 
changes to their output from a change in quality incentives. Overall, we find that loss aversion 
leads participants to focus more on quantity and less on quality, while increasing the number of 
problems answered incorrectly. In addition, we characterize participants by whether they focus on 
pursuing quality or quantity during the experiment, and find that higher quality incentives increase 
the number of subjects whose primary focus is quality. 
In what follows, Section 2 describes the theoretical model and predictions. Section 3 
outlines the experimental design. Section 4 summarizes the results, and Section 5 provides a 
discussion and conclusion. 
 
2. Theoretical Model and Predictions  
2.1. Theoretical Model 
In this model, we provide insight into how economic agents exert effort under different rewards 
for the quantity and quality of their output. Consider an agent who exerts two-dimensional effort 
𝑒 = (𝑒1, 𝑒2), where 𝑒1 ≥ 0 is effort used to produce quantity and 𝑒2 ≥ 0 is effort used to produce 
quality. The agent has one unit of effort to provide, so 𝑒1 + 𝑒2 = 1. The agent has ability 𝑎 > 0, 
and agents with higher ability produce high quality output at lower cost (for a given level of effort). 
The quantity of high-quality output produced, 𝑞𝐻 = 𝑒1𝑝(𝑒2), depends on effort 𝑒1 used to 
produce quantity and effort 𝑒2 used to increase the probability of successful production 𝑝(𝑒2), 
where 𝑝′ > 0, 𝑝′′ < 0, 𝑝(0) = 0, and 𝑝(1) = 1. The low-quality output is produced with a 
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remaining probability, i.e., 𝑞𝐿 = 𝑒1(1 − 𝑝(𝑒2)). The cost of exerting effort to produce quality is 
𝑐(𝑒2, 𝑎), where 𝑐1 > 0, 𝑐2 < 0, 𝑐11 > 0, 𝑐12 < 0, and 𝑐(0, 𝑎) = 0. We use a simplifying 
assumption that the cost to produce quantity is not a function of ability and it is normalized to 
zero.3 The agent receives wage 𝑤1 ≥ 0 for each output (payment for quantity) and wage 𝑤2 ≥ 0 
for each high-quality output (payment for quality). We assume that quality is perfectly verifiable. 
The payoff of the agent is: 
𝑈 = 𝑤1(𝑞
𝐻 + 𝑞𝐿) + 𝑤2𝑞
𝐻 − 𝑐(𝑒2, 𝑎) = 𝑤1𝑒1 +𝑤2𝑒1𝑝(𝑒2) − 𝑐(𝑒2, 𝑎)  (1) 
Since 𝑒1 = 1 − 𝑒2 in equilibrium, the agent’s first order condition 
𝜕𝑈
𝜕𝑒2
= 0 is: 
−𝑤1 − 𝑤2𝑝(𝑒2) + 𝑤2(1 − 𝑒2)𝑝′(𝑒2) − 𝑐1(𝑒2, 𝑎) = 0    (2) 
 
2.2. Predictions 
From the first order condition in (2), we can derive comparative statics predictions related to how 
optimal effort levels respond to changes in relative wages. Consider first how effort changes as the 
relative return from producing quality increases (i.e., 𝑤2 increases relative to 𝑤1). From (2), there 
are increasing differences in {𝑒2, 𝑤2} if and only if 𝑒2 ≤ 1 −
𝑝(𝑒2)
𝑝′(𝑒2)
. Note that this also means that 
there are increasing differences in {𝑒2, 𝑤2} if and only if 
𝜕𝑞𝐻
𝜕𝑒2
≥ 0, since 
𝜕𝑞𝐻
𝜕𝑒2
= −𝑝(𝑒2) + (1 −
𝑒2)𝑝′(𝑒2) and thus 
𝜕𝑞𝐻
𝜕𝑒2
≥ 0 implies 𝑒2 ≤ 1 −
𝑝(𝑒2)
𝑝′(𝑒2)
. Intuitively, it must be true that 
𝜕𝑞𝐻
𝜕𝑒2
≥ 0 at any 
level of 𝑒2 chosen by the agent: otherwise, increasing 𝑒2 would decrease both high-quality output 
𝑞𝐻 and low-quality output 𝑞𝐿.4 Hence, there are increasing differences in {𝑒2, 𝑤2}, and 𝑒2 is 
increasing in 𝑤2. Finally, there is some 𝑒
∗, which solves 𝑒∗ = 1 −
𝑝(𝑒∗)
𝑝′(𝑒∗)
, which the optimal value 
                                                 
3 Including the cost of 𝑒1 in the agent’s utility function would change none of the comparative static results. 
4 To see this, note that 𝑞𝐿 = (1 − 𝑒2)(1 − 𝑝(𝑒2)), which is clearly decreasing in 𝑒2. 
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of 𝑒2 never exceeds. This intuition is summarized in the following proposition and represented 
graphically in Figure 1. 
 
Proposition 1:  As 𝑤2 increases, the optimal value 𝑒1
∗ weakly decreases and 𝑒2
∗ weakly increases. 
 
It follows directly from Proposition 1 that 
𝜕(𝑞𝐻+𝑞𝐿)
𝜕𝑤2
≤ 0 since 𝑞𝐻 + 𝑞𝐿 = 𝑒1 and 
𝜕𝑒1
𝜕𝑤2
≤ 0, 
implying that higher quality incentives decrease the total output (the sum of high-quality and low-
quality output). We state this as Prediction 1: 
 
Prediction 1:  The total quantity of output 𝑞𝐻 + 𝑞𝐿 is weakly decreasing in 𝑤2. 
 
It also follows from Proposition 1 that 
𝜕𝑞𝐻
𝜕𝑤2
≥ 0. Recall that 𝑞𝐻 = 𝑒1𝑝(𝑒2) =
(1 − 𝑒2)𝑝(𝑒2). Therefore, 
𝜕𝑞𝐻
𝜕𝑤2
=
𝜕𝑒2
𝜕𝑤2
[−𝑝(𝑒2) + (1 − 𝑒2)𝑝′(𝑒2)] ≥ 0 since 
𝜕𝑒2
𝜕𝑤2
≥ 0 and the term 
in brackets is always non-negative in equilibrium. The intuition behind this result is that an increase 
in 𝑤2 encourages the agent to spend more effort in a manner where more high-quality units are 
produced. Sometimes this means reducing the effort 𝑒1 spent on producing quantity, as noted 
above. This brings us to the next prediction: 
 
Prediction 2: The level of high-quality output 𝑞𝐻 is weakly increasing in 𝑤2. 
 
Next, we define the error rate as the fraction of low-quality output relative to total output, 
or 
𝑞𝐿
𝑞𝐻+𝑞𝐿
. From Proposition 1, it follows that 
𝜕(𝑞𝐿/(𝑞𝐻+𝑞𝐿))
𝜕𝑤2
≤ 0. To show this, note that 
𝑞𝐿
𝑞𝐻+𝑞𝐿
=
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𝑒1(1−𝑝(𝑒2))
𝑒1
= 1 − 𝑝(𝑒2). Therefore, 
𝜕(𝑞𝐿/(𝑞𝐻+𝑞𝐿))
𝜕𝑤2
=
𝜕(1−𝑝(𝑒2))
𝜕𝑤2
= −
𝜕𝑒2
𝜕𝑤2
𝑝′(𝑒2) ≤ 0 since 
𝜕𝑒2
𝜕𝑤2
≥ 0 
and 𝑝1 > 0. This brings us to the next prediction: 
 
Prediction 3:  The error rate 
𝑞𝐿
𝑞𝐻+𝑞𝐿
 is weakly decreasing in 𝑤2. 
 
Finally, consider how the agent’s ability affects her decision to focus on quality effort 𝑒2. 
Since ability only enters into the cost function, it follows directly from (2) that there are increasing 
differences in {𝑒2, 𝑎}, and hence 𝑒2 is increasing in 𝑎. The intuition underlying this result is 
straight-forward: higher ability agents face a lower marginal cost from exerting effort used to 
produce quality, so they choose greater 𝑒2. This intuition is summarized in the following 
proposition: 
 
 Proposition 2: As 𝑎 increases, the optimal value 𝑒1
∗ weakly decreases and 𝑒2
∗ weakly increases. 
 
Predictions 4, 5, and 6 follow the same mathematical logic as Predictions 1, 2, and 3, 
respectively. For the sake of brevity we do not repeat the mathematics nor the intuition, but simply 
note that the sign of 
𝜕𝑒1
∗
𝜕𝑤2
 equals the sign of 
𝜕𝑒1
∗
𝜕𝑎
 and the sign of 
𝜕𝑒2
∗
𝜕𝑤2
 equals the sign of 
𝜕𝑒2
∗
𝜕𝑎
, entailing 
that the above comparative statics are the same with respect to 𝑎 as they are with respect to 𝑤2. 
 
Prediction 4:  The total quantity of output 𝑞𝐻 + 𝑞𝐿 is weakly decreasing in 𝑎. 
 
Prediction 5: The level of high-quality output 𝑞𝐻 is weakly increasing in 𝑎. 
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Prediction 6:  The error rate 
𝑞𝐿
𝑞𝐻+𝑞𝐿
 is weakly decreasing in 𝑎. 
 
3. Experimental Design and Procedures 
The experiment used participants drawn from the population of undergraduate students at the 
University of Wisconsin-Madison. Computerized experimental sessions were run using z-Tree 
(Fischbacher, 2007) at the Behavioral Research Insights Through Experiments (BRITE) 
Laboratory. A total of 197 participants participated in 14 experimental sessions. Upon arriving at 
the laboratory, participants were randomly assigned to a computer station. The experiment 
proceeded in seven parts. All participants were given written instructions, available in Appendix 
A, at the beginning of each part, and an experimenter also read the instructions aloud. 
In the first part, participants performed a real effort task: adding up sets of five randomly 
generated 2-digit numbers by hand, as quickly as possible, with no assistance other than a pen and 
paper (no calculators), for 5 minutes. The 2-digit numbers task is commonly used in the 
experimental literature because it is easy to explain, does not require previous experience and 
performance is not associated with a particular gender, socioeconomic background, or physical 
conditioning (Niederle and Vesterlund, 2007; Cason et al., 2010). In each treatment, participants 
were provided with up to 60 problems (one at a time) they could attempt to solve during 5 minutes. 
Participants could see only one problem at a time and they could not skip any problems. Each time 
a participant arrived at a new problem, she had 5 seconds to review it before the submit button 
appeared. After spending at least 5 seconds, the computer allowed participants to enter their 
answers. The 5 second delay can be considered an opportunity cost of skipping a problem by 
submitting any random answer.  
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In all treatments, as shown in Table 1, participants received 𝑤1 = $0.10 for each attempted 
problem (i.e., for quantity). Depending on the treatment, participants also received an additional 
bonus for each attempted problem answered correctly (i.e., for quality), varying from 𝑤2 = $0.00 
in the T-0.00 treatment to 𝑤2 = $3.00 in the T-3.00 treatment for each attempted problem answered 
correctly. 
In the second part, we elicited beliefs about output quality by asking participants to provide 
a guess about how many of the attempted problems in the first part they solved correctly. 
Participants received an additional $3 if their guess was equal to the number of correct answers 
they provided in the first part. Participants were not aware of the second part until after they 
finished the first part of the experiment. The main purpose of eliciting participants’ beliefs about 
their performance was to test whether the measured quantity and quality of output from part 1 
matched the participants’ own beliefs about how much quality they attempted. 
In order to learn whether behavioral motivations play a role in responsiveness to quality 
incentives, in parts 3-5, we elicited participants’ preferences toward ambiguity, risk and loss. 
While our theoretical model did not make a clear prediction about the role of behavioral 
motivations, such motivations have been shown to be important in principal-agent relationships in 
the field (Haigh and List, 2005; Hossain and List, 2012). 
In part 3, we elicited participants’ preferences toward ambiguity from a set of 20 lotteries 
(see Table B1 in Appendix B). In each lottery, participants were asked to state whether they prefer 
an ambiguous option A ($0.00 or $10.00 with unknown chance each) or a safe option B (increasing 
monotonically from $0.50 to $10.00).5 Parameters were set in such a way that more ambiguity-
averse participants would choose safer options (and switch earlier to a safe option) than less 
                                                 
5 Our elicitation procedure is similar to Shupp et al. (2013). 
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ambiguity-averse participants. Again, participants were not aware of this part until after they 
finished the preceding part. 
In part 4, we elicited participants’ preferences toward risk from a set of 20 lotteries (see 
Table B2 in Appendix B). In each lottery, participants were asked to state whether they prefer a 
risky option A ($0.00 or $10.00 with 50% chance each) or a safe option B (increasing 
monotonically from $0.50 to $10.00). As in previous parts, participants were not aware of this part 
until after they finished the preceding part. 
In part 5, we elicited participants’ preferences toward losses from a set of 20 lotteries (see 
Table B3 in Appendix B). In each lottery, participants were asked to state whether they prefer a 
risky option A (50% chance of losing a certain amount between -$0.50 to -$10.00) or a safe option 
B of $0. As in previous parts, participants were not aware of this part until after they finished the 
preceding part. 
Part 6 was used to obtain a measure of a participants’ ability on the math task, independent 
of incentive concerns. In this part, participants again performed a real effort task (as in the first 
part of the experiment): adding up sets of five randomly generated 2-digit numbers by hand, as 
quickly as possible. This time, participants had only 2.5 minutes to complete the task. The 
computer provided participants with up to 30 math problems (one at a time) that they could attempt 
to solve during the allotted time. As before, participants could see only one problem at a time and 
they could not skip any problems. Each time a participant arrived at a new problem, she had 5 
seconds to review it before the submit button appeared. Participants received $0.50 for each 
problem answered correctly, regardless of the treatment. Contrary to the first part, subjects made 
no earnings from attempted problems that were incorrect.  
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Finally, in part 7, participants were asked to provide a guess about how many of the 
attempted problems in the sixth part they solved correctly. Participants received an additional $3 
if their guess was equal to the number of correct answers they provided in the sixth part. 
Participants were not aware of this task until after they finished the preceding part of the 
experiment. The main purpose of eliciting participants’ beliefs about their performance in the sixth 
part was to obtain a measure of confidence, which may be linked to participants’ decision to put 
more effort into quality or quantity. This measure is comparable across treatments, since it is not 
affected by the quantity-quality incentives that differ across treatments (unlike the guess in part 2, 
which may be a function of the different quantity-quality tradeoffs faced in part 1). 
At the end of the experiment, each participant received earnings from parts 1, 2, 6 and 7. 
For parts 3-5, in order to avoid portfolio effects, only one part and line was paid out at random. 
Each session lasted approximately 90 minutes. Participants’ earnings ranged from $10.50 to 
$119.70, with a median of $25.60. In addition to their earnings in the experiment, participants also 
received a $7.00 show-up fee. 
 
4. Results 
4.1. How Incentives Impact Quantity and Quality 
The summary statistics of our experiment are reported in Table 2 and represented graphically in 
Figures 2-4. First, we examine how higher quality incentives (i.e., higher reward for solving 
problems correctly) impact quantity (i.e., the number of problems attempted). Prediction 1 states 
that the level of total output (i.e., 𝑞𝐻 + 𝑞𝐿) should decrease with higher quality incentives (i.e., 
𝑤2). 
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We begin by noting that there is no significant difference in the number of problems 
attempted between treatments T-0.00 and T-0.05 where quality incentives are low (25.63 versus 
27.58; Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p-value = 0.43). Similarly, there are no differences between 
treatments T-0.25 and T-0.50 where quality incentives are medium (18.15 versus 18.51; Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test, p-value = 0.96) and treatments T-1.00 and T-3.00 where quality incentives are high 
(13.85 versus 13.20; Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p-value = 0.35). In the analysis that follows, we 
report pooled data from the low quality incentive treatments T-0.00 and T-0.05, the medium 
quality incentive treatments T-0.25 and T-0.50, and the high quality incentive treatments T-1.00 
and T-3.00.  
Figure 2 suggests that there are clear differences in the number of problems attempted 
between treatments with low quality incentives (i.e., T-0.00 and T-0.05), medium quality 
incentives (i.e., T-0.25 and T-0.50) and high quality incentives (i.e., T-1.00 and T-3.00). Pairwise 
comparisons show that the differences in distributions are statistically significant (Wilcoxon rank-
sum test, six p-values < 0.01 and two p-values < 0.08). We also find significant differences when 
comparing all treatments jointly (Kruskal-Wallis test, p-value < 0.01). Therefore, consistent with 
Prediction 1, we find that higher incentives for quality decrease quantity of output. 
 
Result 1:  Higher quality incentives decrease quantity of output. 
 
Second, we examine how higher quality incentives impact quality (i.e., the number of 
problems solved correctly). Recall that Prediction 2 states that the level of high-quality output (i.e., 
𝑞𝐻) should increase with higher quality incentives (i.e., 𝑤2). 
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We find no significant difference in quality between T-0.00 and T-0.05 (Wilcoxon rank-
sum test, p-value = 0.65). Also, there are no differences in quality between T-0.25, T-0.50, T-1.00, 
and T-3.00 (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, four p-values > 0.35). However, we see significant difference 
in quality when comparing treatments with low quality incentives to treatments with medium and 
high quality incentives (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, eight p-values < 0.04). The differences are also 
significant when comparing all treatments jointly (Kruskal-Wallis test, p-value < 0.01). Therefore, 
consistent with Prediction 2, we find that higher incentives for quality increase quality of output. 
 
Result 2:  Higher quality incentives increase quality of output. 
 
Third, we examine how higher quality incentives impact the error rate. To calculate the 
error rate, we use the ratio of the number of problems solved incorrectly to the number of problems 
attempted. Recall that Prediction 3 states that the error rate (i.e., 
𝑞𝐿
𝑞𝐻+𝑞𝐿
) should decrease with higher 
quality incentives (i.e., 𝑤2).  
There are no significant differences in the error rate between T-0.00 and T-0.05 (Wilcoxon 
rank-sum test, p-value = 0.48), between T-0.25 and T-0.50 (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p-value = 
0.49), and between T-1.00 and T-3.00 (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p-value = 0.35). However, we 
find that the error rate in treatments with high quality incentives is significantly lower than in 
treatments with medium quality incentives (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, three p-values < 0.01 and one 
p-value < 0.07). Similarly, the error rate in treatments with medium quality incentives is 
significantly lower than in treatments with low quality incentives (Wilcoxon rank-sum test, three 
p-values < 0.01 and one p-value < 0.03). The differences are also significant when comparing all 
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treatments jointly (Kruskal-Wallis test, p-value < 0.01), suggesting that, consistent with Prediction 
3, the error rate decreases with higher quality incentives. 
 
Result 3:  Higher quality incentives decrease the error rate. 
 
Together, Results 1, 2, and 3 provide strong support for the theoretical predictions of our 
model: higher quality incentives encourage participants to shift their attention from quantity to 
quality by increasing quality of output and decreasing the error rate at the expense of lowering 
quantity of output.  
 
4.2. Individual Characteristics 
Next, we explore whether individual characteristics impact the choice of quality versus quantity. 
To answer this question, we elicited different individual characteristics summarized in Table 3. 
Specifically, in part 6 of the experiment, we elicited an independent measure of participants’ ability 
by having participants perform a real effort task during 150 seconds. In part 7, we elicited 
participants’ beliefs about their performance in part 6 (see Appendix A for details). Using these 
beliefs, we compute an individual measure of overconfidence, defined as the predicted number of 
problems solved correctly in part 6 minus the number of problems actually solved correctly. From 
Table 3, we see that the median participant is overconfident, overestimating his performance by 1 
correct problem (the mean participant overestimates performance by 0.84 correct problems). 
Knowing that preferences towards uncertainty play an important role in decision making, 
we also elicited preferences regarding ambiguity, risk, and losses using multiple lottery choice 
mechanisms (see Table B1, Table B2, and Table B3 in Appendix B). Parameters of the elicitation 
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procedure were set in such a way that the more ambiguity-, risk- and loss-averse participants would 
choose ‘safer’ options relative to ‘uncertain’ options (and switch earlier from an ‘uncertain’ option 
to a ‘safe’ option) than the less ambiguity-, risk- and loss-averse participant. Although the three 
elicitation tasks are not directly comparable, in all three tasks, a higher number (of ‘safe’ options) 
implies a higher level of aversion toward ambiguity, risk and losses.6 
Next, we examine whether the elicited characteristics of participants are predictive of the 
number of problems attempted, the number of problems solved, and the error rate. First, we 
examine what factors influence the number of problems attempted. Table 4 shows the estimation 
results of different OLS regressions in which the dependent variable is quantity of output (the 
number of problems attempted), and the independent variables are the dummy for treatments with 
medium quality incentives (i.e., T-0.25 and T-0.50), the dummy for treatments with high quality 
incentives (i.e., T-1.00 and T-3.00), and ability. Specification (2) supports the non-parametric 
results by showing that medium and high quality incentives decrease quantity of output relative to 
low quality incentives, and that high quality incentives decrease quantity of output relative to 
medium quality incentives (as indicated by the p-value at the bottom of Table 4). Specifications 
(1) and (2) indicate that there is no statistically significant relationship between the participant’s 
ability and quantity of output. This is contrary to Prediction 4, which suggested that total quantity 
should be decreasing in ability. A potential explanation is that the relationship between ability and 
quantity is non-linear: subjects of sufficiently high ability may have been able to exert little effort 
on quality while still answering problems correctly, thus achieving higher quality and quantity. 
                                                 
6 A simple correlation analysis shown in Table B4 in Appendix B indicates that there is a strong correlation between 
ambiguity-aversion and risk-aversion (ρ = 0.67), and somewhat weaker correlation between loss-aversion and 
ambiguity-aversion (ρ = 0.30) and loss-aversion and risk-aversion (ρ = 0.35). 
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This insight does not follow directly from the model,7 but it does make intuitive sense. To address 
this possibility, we include an ability-squared term. As expected, the coefficient on this term is 
positive and statistically significant, indicating that at sufficiently high ability levels subjects can 
focus on quantity (without, presumably, losing much quality; see Table 6). The coefficient on 
ability is negative, though imprecisely estimated. 
We next examine the impact of elicited individual characteristics on quantity of output, 
reported in Table 5. We find that overconfidence, risk, and ambiguity are not predictive of quantity 
(specifications 1, 2, and 3). However, we find that loss aversion is a significant predictor of 
quantity (specification 4), with participants who are more loss-averse choosing to focus on quantity 
by attempting more problems. This finding is intuitive. By focusing on quantity, participants can 
always guarantee a certain amount of payment for their performance, i.e., 𝑤1(𝑞
𝐻 + 𝑞𝐿) = 𝑤1𝑒1, 
while focusing on quality involves the possibility of not solving the problem correctly, i.e., 
𝑤2𝑞
𝐻 = 𝑤2𝑒1𝑝(𝑒2, 𝑎). Therefore, a loss-averse participant may choose to focus mainly on 
quantity in order to minimize potential losses. To check the robustness of our findings, we include 
additional interaction terms (specification 5).8 Besides confirming our previous findings, we also 
find that higher quality incentives affect loss-averse participants less. The most straight-forward 
interpretation of this result is that loss aversion is less salient when incentives for quality are high, 
because the loss incurred from spending more time on a problem is smaller relative to the potential 
gains of getting the problem correct. We report additional robustness checks with individual 
treatment dummies in Table B5 in Appendix B. 
 
                                                 
7 Although a simple addition to the model, where the probability of producing high-quality output is in part a function 
of ability, could yield this result. 
8 Including interaction terms with overconfidence, risk, and ambiguity does not yield any statistically significant 
results, and we therefore do not report these results for the sake of brevity. These results are available upon request. 
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Result 4:  Participants focus more on quantity (attempt more problems) if they are more 
loss-averse. 
 
Next, we examine what factors influence the choice of quality (the number of problems 
solved). The estimation results reported in Tables 6 and 7 provide support for the non-parametric 
results that medium and high quality incentives increase quality of output. Also, we find that 
consistent with Prediction 5, ability is positively and significantly correlated with quality, 
suggesting that participants of higher ability are more likely to focus on quality of output. This is 
not simply a matter of participants who are better at math in part 6 being better at math in part 1: 
whether participants focus on quantity is a decision in part 1. Furthermore, we find that loss 
aversion is a significant predictor of quality (specifications 4 and 5 in Table 7), with participants 
who are less loss-averse choosing to focus on quality by solving more problems. Again, this 
finding is intuitive, since focusing on quality entails losing out on the sure wage (i.e., 𝑤1 = $0.10) 
associated with focusing on quantity. Hence, more loss averse participants are less willing to take 
such a loss. As was the case in the quantity regressions, loss aversion only shows up as salient in 
the low quality incentive treatments (see specification 5 in Table 7). Intuitively, in the low quality 
incentive treatments, the benefit of focusing on quality is low relative to the loss of the sure wage 
associated with focusing on quantity. As the quality incentive increase, the latter loss becomes 
relatively less salient. We report additional robustness checks with individual treatment dummies 
in Table B6 in Appendix B. 
 
Result 5:  Participants focus more on quality (solve more problems correctly) if they have 
higher ability or if they are less loss-averse. 
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Finally, we examine what factors influence the error rate. The estimation results reported 
in Tables 8 and 9 provide support for the non-parametric results that medium and high quality 
incentives decrease the error rate. Moreover, consistent with Prediction 6, in all specifications we 
find that ability is negatively and significantly correlated with the error rate, suggesting that 
participants of higher ability have lower error rates. There is a positive and significant relationship 
between loss aversion and the error rate in specifications (4) and (5) of Table 9, confirming our 
previous findings relating loss aversion to quantity and quality. We report additional robustness 
checks with individual treatment dummies in Table B7 in Appendix B. 
 
Result 6:  Participants have higher error rates if they have lower ability or if they are more 
loss-averse. 
 
To summarize, Results 4, 5, and 6 indicate that there are important individual 
characteristics impacting the quantity-quality tradeoff. First, we find that there is heterogeneity in 
the impact of treatment, with more loss-averse individuals displaying greater changes to their 
output from a change in quality incentives. Loss aversion leads participants to focus more on 
quantity and less on quality, while increasing the error rates. Also, we find that, consistent with 
the theoretical predictions, higher ability participants choose to focus more on quality and have 
lower error rates. 
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4.3. Classification of Participants 
Next, we characterize participants by response time to identify how treatment differences affected 
the incentives of participants to focus primarily on quantity or quality. We begin by examining 
how much time participants spend on average on a given problem, which we consider an indicator 
of how much effort participants exert on quality. We assume that participants who spent more time 
on a problem than the average were more likely to be focusing on quality. As shown in Table 10, 
there are no significant differences in the average time spent on a problem between the low quality 
incentive treatments T-0.00 and T-0.05 (15.83 versus 13.73; Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p-value = 
0.57). Similarly, there are no differences between medium quality incentives treatments T-0.25 
and T-0.50 (18.19 versus 18.37; Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p-value = 0.98) and high quality 
incentives treatments T-1.00 and T-3.00 (22.83 versus 23.28; Wilcoxon rank-sum test, p-value = 
0.36). However, there are clear differences in the average time spent per problem when comparing 
low quality incentive treatments with medium and high quality incentive treatments, and there is 
likewise a difference comparing medium incentive treatments with high incentive treatments. 
Pairwise comparisons show that the differences in distributions are statistically significant 
(Wilcoxon rank-sum test, ten p-values < 0.01 and two p-values < 0.07). The difference are also 
significant when comparing all treatment jointly (Kruskal-Wallis test, p-value < 0.01). 
Table 10 also reports the fraction of problems answered ‘quickly’ (signifying that a 
participant is focusing on quantity) by treatment. Recall that each participant had to spend a 
minimum of 5 seconds on each problem since the ‘submit’ button did not appear on the screen 
until 5 seconds had passed. We therefore look at different cut-off points – 6, 7, and 10 seconds – 
to see whether participants answer more quickly when quality is not incentivized. We find that 
25% of problems were answered within 6 seconds when the reward for solving problems is not 
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incentivized (i.e., T-0.00), while only 2% answer within 6 seconds when the reward is highly 
incentivized (i.e., T-1.00 and T-3.00) (Kruskal-Wallis test across all six treatments, p-value < 
0.01). A similar pattern is observed for participants answering within 7 seconds (Kruskal-Wallis 
test, p-value < 0.01) and within 10 seconds (Kruskal-Wallis test, p-value < 0.01). 
Finally, the last column in Table 10 shows the fraction of participants choosing to focus 
only on quality. We define a participant as focusing on quality on a specific question if they either 
answered the question correctly or they spent at least as much time answering the problem as the 
minimum time it took them to answer a question in part 6 (where quantity was not incentivized 
and payouts were the same across treatments).9 As expected, we find that higher quality incentives 
increase the number of quality types (Kruskal-Wallis test, p-value < 0.01). 
 
Result 7:  Higher quality incentives increase the number of participants focusing on quality 
and decrease the number of participants focusing on quantity. 
 
4.4. Optimal Choice of Quantity and Quality 
A participant making a decision of whether to focus on quantity or quality should take into account 
her ability to perform the task. As we have already shown, such ability is indeed important in 
making this decision. However, another important factor is the price the participant is rewarded 
for quality. For example, when the reward is 𝑤2 = $0.25, the participant should expect to earn 
$0.35 (𝑤1 = $0.10 for quantity and 𝑤2 = $0.25 for quality) for successfully completing a task, 
                                                 
9 We do not count decisions made in the last 30 seconds or decisions made in the participant’s last answer because the 
decision-making calculus at the end of the five minute period may be different than in the first four minutes. For 
instance, one who can correctly answer a problem in 10 seconds (meaning that she should focus on quality in most of 
the treatments) has incentive to input a quick answer if there are only 6 seconds remaining. Moreover, we derived 
numerous definitions for quality and all give similar qualitative results. The statistics associated with other metrics are 
available upon request. 
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which comes at the cost of spending time on that task (say 𝑥 seconds depending on the ability). 
However, the participant also has an option to focus solely on quantity, which would result in a 
reward of 𝑤1 = $0.10 at the cost of a minimum 5 seconds spent on the task. Therefore, each 
participant should make a choice of whether to focus on quantity or quality depending on their 
relative ability to complete the task in 𝑥 seconds and prices 𝑤1 and 𝑤2. Specifically, if (𝑤1 +
𝑤2)/𝑥 > 𝑤1/5 then a participant should focus on quality, and otherwise they should focus on 
quantity. One immediate implication is that higher 𝑤2 should lead participants to pay more 
attention to quality. See a more formal discussion of this argument in Section 2, Proposition 1. 
We can therefore calculate how many participants should have chosen to focus on quality 
given their ability. As a proxy for ability, we use the average time a participant needs to solve one 
problem correctly in part 6. Table 11 summarizes the average ability of participants across 
treatments: the first column reports the average number of seconds subjects spent on each problem 
in part 6 in each treatment. Not surprisingly, since participants were randomly assigned to each 
treatment, there is no difference in ability between treatments (Kruskal-Wallis test, p-value = 0.49). 
However, since the reward for quality is different across treatments, the expected earnings are 
different. For example, when the reward is $0.25 per correct answer, a participant who spends 30 
seconds to solve one problem correctly should expect to earn $3.50 if she chooses to focus on 
quality, i.e., ($0.25 + $0.10) × 300/30 = $3.50. However, if instead, such a participant chooses to 
focus solely on quantity, she can earn $6 since the opportunity cost is 5 seconds of moving to the 
next problem, i.e., $0.10 × 300/5 = $6.00. Therefore, a rational decision maker who can solve only 
one problem during 30 seconds should choose to focus on quantity when the reward for quality is 
$0.25. Similar computations can be performed for all participants in each treatment. Table 11 
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reports the fraction of participants who should choose quality over quantity based on their ability 
and quality incentives. 
Obviously, when the reward for quality is $0.00, nobody should choose to focus on quality. 
The same is true when the reward is only $0.05 for all but the most mathematically gifted (none 
of whom took part in this treatment). When the reward is $0.25, 12% of participants should choose 
to focus on quality. When the reward is $0.50 this number increases to 79%, and further to 97% 
when the reward is $1.00. Finally, when the reward is $3.00, all participants should focus on 
quality. Using this information, we can calculate the portion of participants in each treatment that 
chose to correctly focus on quantity or quality. We first calculate their average earnings from 
focusing on quality, as measured by the average time they spent deriving a correct answer in part 
6 (see Table 11). Using this measure, we calculate their expected earnings from focusing on 
quality, which equals (300 / average seconds per correct answer) × ($0.10 + 𝑤2), where 𝑤2 differs 
by treatment. Any participant whose expected earnings from focusing on quality exceed $6 (the 
amount one could earn from solely focusing on quantity) should focus on quality; otherwise they 
should focus on quantity. We consider it a mistake for a participant to focus on quality (even once) 
when she should focus on quantity or for a participant to focus on quantity (even once) when she 
should focus on quality.10 Table 11 shows that 85% of participants make mistakes when quality is 
not at all incentivized (i.e., T-0.00), while only 7% make mistakes when the reward is most highly 
incentivized (i.e., T-3.00) (Kruskal-Wallis test, p-value < 0.01). The same conclusion stands when 
we drop the first 34 seconds of experiment, which is one standard deviation above the mean time 
taken to answer a question in part 6 (Kruskal-Wallis test, p-value < 0.01). 
 
                                                 
10 Similar to before, we do not count decisions made in the last 30 seconds or decisions made in the participant’s last 
answer in this calculation. 
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Result 8:  Higher quality incentives encourage participants to make better trade-offs 
between quantity and quality, reducing inefficient decision making. 
 
4.5. Optimal Wage Schemes for Employers 
Finally, our experiment has implications for the optimal type of labor contracts that employers 
offer workers. Of course, the optimal contract will depend on the conditions faced by the employer. 
Employers whose product receives a high price for quality will want to incentivize quality more 
than employers whose product’s price is less dependent on quality. 
Although we do not wish to push the specific results of our experiment too far, these results 
have implications for the type of contracts that employers offer their workers. Specifically, assume 
that employers face the following profit equation: 
𝜋 = 𝑝𝐿𝑞𝐿 + 𝑝𝐻𝑞𝐻−𝑤1𝑞𝐿 − 𝑤2𝑞𝐻 = (𝑝𝐿 − 𝑤1)𝑞𝐿 + (𝑝𝐻 −𝑤2)𝑞𝐻,   (4) 
where 𝑞𝐻 ≥ 0 and 𝑞𝐿 ≥ 0 are the quantities of high quality and low quality output, 𝑝𝐻 ≥ 0 is the 
price received for high quality output, and 𝑝𝐿 ∈ ℝ the price received for low quality output. Note 
that 𝑝𝐿 may be negative (if a company has to refund low quality or is sued) or positive. 𝑤1 ≥ 0 is 
the wage paid for low quality output and 𝑤2 ≥ 0 is the wage paid for high quality output. In our 
experiment, 𝑤1 = $0.10 and 𝑤2 varies by treatment. 
In this profit equation, 𝑝𝐿 and 𝑝𝐻 are exogenous parameters (assuming the market is 
competitive), and 𝑤1 and 𝑤2 are choice variables. The question that our experiment answers – for 
a specific set of parameters – is which wage scheme among six possible ones is optimal for a given 
set {𝑝𝐿 , 𝑝𝐻}. Figure 7 reports the results. Employing 𝑤1 = $0.10 and the summary statistics of 
each treatment to determine 𝑞𝐿 and 𝑞𝐻, these figures indicate that providing low quantity incentives 
(i.e., 𝑤2 = $0.00 and $0.05) is an optimal strategy when the price for quantity is positive and the 
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price for quality is not sufficiently large. When there is a penalty for low quality output, it is 
optimal to incentivize for quality. As long as the penalty is not too large, it is optimal to provide a 
medium quality incentive (i.e., 𝑤2 = $0.25) – participants produce enough high-quality output that 
it is not worthwhile to pay them more to receive marginally more high-quality output. Also note 
that 𝑤2 = $0.50 is not optimal in the price range shown in Figure 7, indicating diminishing returns 
to 𝑤2 once quality is sufficiently incentivized.
11 When the costs associated with low-quality output 
are high (i.e., 𝑝𝐿 is sufficiently negative), it is optimal for employers to impose greater quality 
incentives (i.e., 𝑤2 = $1.00). But the marginal benefits attained by much higher wages (i.e., 𝑤2 = 
$3.00) are only worth it if 𝑝𝐿 is highly negative or 𝑝𝐻 is very large (indeed, this figure would need 
a much larger range to show where 𝑤2 = $3.00 is optimal). In other words, although greater quality 
incentives are optimal to impose when the return on quality is large, the return on higher wages is 
rapidly diminishing past a certain point. What this point depends on the characteristics of the 
workers (e.g., their ability and loss aversion) and is likely only determinable through employer 
trial and error. 
The specifics of this exercise should obviously not be taken too far; the actual numbers 
apply only to the present experiment. But one upshot of the analysis is that when firms are punished 
for low quality – via lawsuit, return policies, or warehouse fees for unsold goods – even modest 
quality incentives are enough to encourage high quality effort. When punishment is minimal in 
our experiment, “medium” quality incentives are optimal, with the less expensive incentive, 𝑤2 = 
$0.25, dominating the more expensive incentive, 𝑤2 = $0.50. Likewise, when punishment for low 
                                                 
11 It is true, however, that if the range of 𝑝𝐿  and 𝑝𝐻  is sufficiently large, 𝑤2 = $0.50 and 𝑤2 = $3.00 are optimal wages 
in part of the parameter space. 
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quality is severe, high quality incentives are optimal, again with the less expensive incentive, 𝑤2 
= $1.00, dominating the more expensive incentive, 𝑤2 = $3.00. 
 
5. Discussion and Conclusion 
Firms face an optimization problem that requires a maximal quantity output given a quality 
constraint. It is not trivial to incentivize economic agents to care not only about quantity but also 
about quality of output. A large literature suggests that incentives designed to encourage certain 
behaviors may backfire (Bowles, 2009; Gneezy et al., 2011; Bowles and Polania-Reyes, 2012). 
For example, incentives that are ‘too small’ may crowd out intrinsic motivation to put forth effort 
(Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000).12 The problem becomes even more complicated when quality is 
incorporated into consideration. On the one hand, incentivizing quality may increase individual 
performance. On the other hand, incentivizing quality may decrease quantity of output. Moreover, 
incentivizing quality may be too costly. 
We provide a theoretical model and conduct an experiment to examine how incentivizing 
quality impacts individual decisions to focus on quality versus quantity. Consistent with theoretical 
predictions, we find that higher quality incentives encourage participants to shift their attention 
from quantity to quality by increasing quality of output and decreasing the error rate – at the 
expense of lowering quantity of output. We also find that higher quality incentives encourage 
participants to make better quantity-quality trade-offs, reducing inefficient decision making. 
Our findings have direct practical relevance for managers and employers. First, we show 
both theoretically and experimentally that there are important quantity-quality trade-offs that 
                                                 
12 Along these lines, Mellstrom and Johannesson (2008) provide evidence that monetary incentives may decrease 
(instead of increasing) blood donations. Rietz et al. (2013) show that imposing restrictive rules may have a detrimental 
impact on a gift-exchange relationship. 
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should be taken into account when designing contracts. For example, a manager who is highly 
concerned with the quality of output may choose to incentivize high-quality output. This should 
lead to higher quality of output and a lower error rate. However, it will most likely decrease 
quantity of output. Moreover, the results of our experiment show that although greater quality 
incentives are optimal to impose when the return on quality is large, the return on higher wages 
diminishes rapidly past a certain point. Therefore, the optimal compensation scheme should 
involve a balance between rewarding quantity and quality. For instance, Mauboussin (2012) 
provides an example of the Wallace Company, a pipe and valve distributor which won the 
prestigious Malcolm Baldrige National Quality Award in 1990 but had to file for bankruptcy two 
years later. Mauboussin concludes that “both too little and too much quality can be bad for a 
company’s financial performance.” Our study provides both theoretical and empirical evidence for 
this insight. 
Second, our findings contribute to the literature examining how behavioral components 
can be used to improve work outcomes (Haigh and List, 2005; Hossain and List, 2012). Hossain 
and List (2012), for example, show that a manager can significantly improve the performance of 
workers by framing contracts in terms of “losses”. We also find in our experiment that more loss-
averse participants display greater changes to their output from a change in quality incentives. 
Participants who are more loss-averse choose to focus more on quantity, increasing the error rates. 
Therefore, a manager who is highly concerned with the quality of output may choose to frame 
contracts in terms of losses to reduce the tendency of loss averse workers to focus on quantity 
rather than quality. 
Third, one practical application of our findings relates to an ongoing discussion in health 
economics on how to reward physicians in order to improve medical practice and increase social 
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welfare. One part of the debate is whether to reward physicians solely for the volume of services 
they order (quantity) or to incorporate certain quality measures (quality).13 Our findings suggest 
that rewarding quality is indeed effective in increasing quality of output and decreasing the error 
rate. However, in our experiment, it is easy to define and measure quality, which is not always the 
case in the medical field where quality is ill-defined and may be difficult to measure (Hennig-
Schmidt et al., 2011; Godager et al., 2016).14 
 
 
  
                                                 
13 See the following article in the New York Times: http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/12/nyregion/new-york-city-
hospitals-to-tie-doctors-performance-pay-to-quality-measures.html?pagewanted=2&_r=1&hp 
14 Incorporating quality incentives into a payment scheme can be difficult because measures of quality are not well 
defined and it can be difficult to monitor the quality. Other concerns with using pay-for-performance payment schemes 
are that some doctors will choose to pass on hard patients, while others will choose to perform too many treatments 
to assure good quality. 
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Figure 1: Optimal values of 𝒆𝟏
∗  and 𝒆𝟐
∗  over different values of 𝒘𝟐 
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Figure 2: Measure of quantity (average problems attempted) by treatment 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Measure of quality (average problems correct) by treatment 
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Figure 4: Error rate by treatment 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Fraction of problems answered in less than 10 seconds 
 
 
 
 
  
33 
 
Figure 6: Fraction of subjects focusing only on quality 
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Figure 7: Optimal wage scheme for 𝒑𝑯 ≤ 𝟓, 𝒑𝑳 ∈ [−𝟓, 𝟓] 
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Table 1: Summary of treatments 
 
Treatment 
Payment for each problem 
N Attempted Correct 
T-0.00 $0.10 $0.00 27 
T-0.05 $0.10 $0.05 33 
T-0.25 $0.10 $0.25 34 
T-0.50 $0.10 $0.50 39 
T-1.00 $0.10 $1.00 34 
T-3.00 $0.10 $3.00 30 
 
 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics 
 
Reward 
Average 
attempted 
Average 
correct 
Average 
incorrect 
Error rate = 
incorrect/attempted N 
$0.00 25.63 7.56 18.07 0.57 27 
 (2.86) (1.26) (3.60) (0.07)  
$0.05 27.58 6.67 20.91 0.63 33 
 (2.32) (1.06) (3.14) (0.06)  
$0.25 18.15 10.35 7.79 0.35 34 
 (1.37) (0.78) (1.76) (0.04)  
$0.50 18.51 10.95 7.56 0.33 39 
 (1.30) (0.84) (1.63) (0.05)  
$1.00 13.85 11.00 2.85 0.20 34 
 (0.70) (0.67) (0.66) (0.03)  
$3.00 13.20 11.20 2.00 0.16 30 
 (0.78) (0.91) (0.43) (0.03)  
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
 
Table 3: Elicited characteristics  
 
Percentile 
Ability 
(correct in part 6) 
Overconfidence 
(guess – correct) Ambiguity Risk Loss 
Min 0 -3.00 0 1 4 
25% 5 0.00 10 10 14 
50% 6 1.00 11 11 15 
75% 7 2.00 13 12 17 
Max 17 4.00 20 20 20 
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Table 4: OLS regressions of quantity 
 
Specification (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable = Quantity (number attempted) 
Ability 0.26 0.41 -0.95 
  (correct in part 6) (0.30) (0.26) (0.84) 
Ability2   0.09* 
   (0.05) 
Medium quality incentives  -8.76*** -8.56*** 
  (T-0.25 and T-0.50)  (1.65) (1.65) 
High quality incentives  -13.28*** -13.16*** 
  (T-1.00 and T-3.00)  (1.69) (1.68) 
Constant 17.74*** 24.38*** 28.58*** 
 (1.96) (1.91) (3.11) 
Observations 197 197 197 
p-value, Medium = High -- 0.01 0.00 
R-squared 0.00 0.25 0.26 
 
 
 
Table 5: OLS regressions of quantity, with behavioral characteristics 
 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable = Quantity (number attempted) 
Ability -1.02 -1.02 -1.01 -1.11 -0.70 
  (correct in part 6) (0.87) (0.84) (0.84) (0.83) (0.81) 
Ability2 0.09* 0.09* 0.09* 0.10* 0.08 
 (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Medium quality incentives -8.57*** -8.45*** -8.59*** -9.29*** 17.42* 
  (T-0.25 and T-0.50) (1.65) (1.65) (1.65) (1.65) (8.88) 
High quality incentives -13.19*** -12.92*** -13.13*** -13.33*** 13.62* 
  (T-1.00 and T-3.00) (1.69) (1.69) (1.68) (1.66) (7.65) 
Overconfidence -0.19     
 (0.58)     
Risk aversion  0.29    
  (0.24)    
Ambiguity aversion   0.26   
   (0.22)   
Loss aversion    0.56** 1.77*** 
    (0.23) (0.38) 
Loss aversion ×     -1.81*** 
  Medium quality incentives     (0.58) 
Loss aversion ×     -1.87*** 
  High quality incentives     (0.52) 
Constant 29.07*** 25.60*** 25.78*** 21.11*** 2.30 
 (3.46) (3.99) (3.90) (4.32) (6.35) 
Observations 197 197 197 197 197 
p-value, Medium = High 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 -- 
R-squared 0.26 0.27 0.27 0.28 0.34 
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Table 6: OLS regressions of quality 
 
Specification (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable = Quality (number correct) 
Ability 1.51*** 1.48*** 0.81** 
  (correct in part 6) (0.11) (0.10) (0.32) 
Ability2   0.04** 
   (0.02) 
Medium quality incentives  2.17*** 2.26*** 
  (T-0.25 and T-0.50)  (0.64) (0.63) 
High quality incentives  3.58*** 3.63*** 
  (T-1.00 and T-3.00)  (0.65) (0.64) 
Constant 0.51 -1.24* 0.82 
 (0.71) (0.73) (1.19) 
Observations 197 197 197 
p-value, Medium = High -- 0.02 0.03 
R-squared 0.51 0.58 0.59 
 
 
 
Table 7: OLS regressions of quality, with behavioral characteristics 
 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable = Quality (number correct) 
Ability 0.96*** 0.82** 0.82** 0.86*** 0.78** 
  (correct in part 6) (0.33) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) (0.32) 
Ability2 0.04* 0.04** 0.04** 0.04** 0.05** 
 (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Medium quality incentives 2.27*** 2.25*** 2.27*** 2.48*** -4.65 
  (T-0.25 and T-0.50) (0.63) (0.63) (0.63) (0.64) (3.51) 
High quality incentives 3.69*** 3.60*** 3.63*** 3.68*** -1.38 
  (T-1.00 and T-3.00) (0.64) (0.65) (0.64) (0.64) (3.02) 
Overconfidence 0.37*     
 (0.22)     
Risk aversion  -0.04    
  (0.09)    
Ambiguity aversion   -0.03   
   (0.08)   
Loss aversion    -0.17* -0.43*** 
    (0.09) (0.15) 
Loss aversion ×      0.48** 
  Medium quality incentives      (0.23) 
Loss aversion ×      0.35* 
  High quality incentives      (0.20) 
Constant -0.14 1.22 1.14 3.08* 7.17*** 
 (1.31) (1.53) (1.50) (1.66) (2.51) 
Observations 197 197 197 197 197 
p-value, Medium = High 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.05 -- 
R-squared 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.60 
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Table 8: OLS regressions of the error rate 
 
Specification (1) (2) (3) 
Dependent variable = Error rate (incorrect/attempted) 
Ability -0.05*** -0.04*** -0.08*** 
  (correct in part 6) (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) 
Ability2   0.00* 
   (0.00) 
Medium quality incentives  -0.22*** -0.21*** 
  (T-0.25 and T-0.50)  (0.05) (0.05) 
High quality incentives  -0.41*** -0.41*** 
  (T-1.00 and T-3.00)  (0.05) (0.05) 
Constant 0.65*** 0.84*** 0.96*** 
 (0.06) (0.05) (0.09) 
Observations 197 197 197 
p-value, Medium = High -- 0.00 0.00 
R-squared 0.13 0.38 0.39 
 
 
 
Table 9: OLS regressions of the error rate, with behavioral characteristics 
 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Dependent variable = Error rate (incorrect/attempted) 
Ability -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.08*** -0.08*** 
  (correct in part 6) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Ability2 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 0.00* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Medium quality incentives -0.21*** -0.21*** -0.22*** -0.23*** 0.26 
  (T-0.25 and T-0.50) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.25) 
High quality incentives -0.40*** -0.40*** -0.40*** -0.41*** -0.06 
  (T-1.00 and T-3.00) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.22) 
Overconfidence 0.00     
 (0.02)     
Risk aversion  0.01    
  (0.01)    
Ambiguity aversion   0.01   
   (0.01)   
Loss aversion    0.01* 0.03*** 
    (0.01) (0.01) 
Loss aversion ×      -0.03** 
  Medium quality incentives      (0.02) 
Loss aversion ×      -0.02 
  High quality incentives      (0.01) 
Constant 0.95*** 0.87*** 0.90*** 0.81*** 0.53*** 
 (0.09) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12) (0.18) 
Observations 197 197 197 197 197 
p-value, Medium = High 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 -- 
R-squared 0.39 0.40 0.40 0.40 0.42 
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Table 10: Classification of participants by response time 
 
Reward 
Average time 
per problem 
Fraction guessed 
< 6 seconds 
Fraction guessed 
< 7 seconds 
Fraction guessed 
< 10 seconds 
Fraction only 
choosing quality 
$0.00 15.83 0.25 0.33 0.42 0.33 
 (1.85) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09) 
$0.05 13.73 0.27 0.38 0.48 0.27 
 (1.11) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) 
$0.25 18.19 0.13 0.17 0.21 0.50 
 (1.01) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.09) 
$0.50 18.37 0.09 0.16 0.21 0.49 
 (1.06) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) 
$1.00 22.83 0.02 0.03 0.06 0.79 
 (1.11) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.07) 
$3.00 23.28 0.02 0.02 0.05 0.93 
 (1.28) (0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) 
Standard errors are in parentheses.  
 
 
 
Table 11: Ability and expected earnings from quality 
 
Reward 
Avg. Seconds 
per Correct 
Answer (Part 6) 
Expected 
earnings 
from quality 
Fraction should 
 focus on 
quality Mistake 
Mistake 
(dropping first 
34 seconds) 
$0.00 26.03 1.31 0.00 0.85 0.81 
 (1.80) (0.10) (0.00) (0.07) (0.08) 
$0.05 33.88 1.73 0.00 0.82 0.82 
 (4.35) (0.13) (0.00) (0.07) (0.07) 
$0.25 23.82 4.85 0.12 0.88 0.88 
 (1.28) (0.27) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
$0.50 25.64 8.43 0.79 0.49 0.49 
 (2.05) (0.57) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) 
$1.00 28.93 13.69 0.97 0.21 0.21 
 (3.18) (0.83) (0.03) (0.07) (0.07) 
$3.00 28.48 39.94 1.00 0.07 0.07 
 (3.49) (3.17) (0.00) (0.05) (0.05) 
Standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Appendix A: Instructions 
 
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS 
This is an experiment in the economics of decision-making. Various research agencies have provided funds 
for this research. The instructions are simple.  
The experiment will proceed in 7 parts. Each part contains decision problems that require you to make a 
series of choices that determine your total earnings. The currency used in all parts of the experiment is U.S. Dollars. 
You have already received a $7.00 participation fee. Your earnings from 7 parts of the experiment will be added to 
your participation fee. At the end of today’s experiment, you will be paid in private and in cash. 
It is very important that you remain silent and do not look at other people’s work. If you have any questions, 
or need assistance of any kind, please raise your hand and an experimenter will come to you. If you talk, laugh, exclaim 
out loud, etc., you will be asked to leave and you will not be paid. We expect and appreciate your cooperation.  
At this time we proceed to Part 1 of the experiment. 
 
PART 1 
In this part of the experiment, you will work on your own and have the chance to earn money by solving 2-
digit math problems. At the end of the whole experiment, your entire earnings will be paid out to you immediately 
and in cash. 
You will have 5 minutes (300 seconds) for this part. The computer will provide you with up to 60 math 
problems (one at a time) that you can attempt to solve during this 5 minutes. Each problem will consist of adding 5, 
two-digit numbers. All of the problems are about the same level of difficulty. You will see the problems one at a time 
and you will not be able to skip any problems. You will not be able to go back to any problems. 
Your earnings for each problem depend on your responses in the following way: 
 For each problem you attempt, you will receive $0.10.  
 For each attempted problem you answer correctly, you will receive a bonus of $0.50.  
 For each attempted problem you answer incorrectly, you will receive a penalty of -$0.00.  
Answering a problem correctly means that you have provided the correct answer, for example, 2+2=4 is 
correct while 2+2=3 is incorrect. 
The time remaining will be displayed on the overhead. When 5 minutes are up, time will be called. You will 
not be able to respond to any more problems after time is up because your computer will be on pause. After time is 
called, you will need to enter “0” to move on to the outcome screen, and the last problem you answer will not count 
as an attempt. An example of a problem screen is shown below. 
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Note that you will know which problem you are on. The 5 numbers that you should add are listed in the 
middle of the screen. In this example, you should be adding 28+39+48+23+25. 
Each time you arrive at a new problem, you will have 5 seconds to review it before the submit button appears. 
After spending at least 5 seconds, the computer will allow you enter your answer. Although you will be required to 
spend at least 5 seconds on each problem, you can also spend more than 5 seconds. 
Press “Submit” when you are ready to go on to the next problem. 
You will not know if you answered any one problem correctly or incorrectly until the end of the experiment, 
when you will learn your total number of correct and incorrect responses. 
The actual earnings for this part of the experiment will be determined at the end of the experiment, and will 
be independent of other parts of the experiment. 
 
PART 2 
In this part of the experiment, you will be asked to provide a guess about how many of the attempted problems 
in Part 1 you solved correctly. You will receive an additional $3 if your guess is equal to the number of correct 
answers that you provided us in Part 1.  
Please enter your guess on your screen. Record your answer (and outcome) below. The actual earnings for 
this part of the experiment will be determined at the end of the experiment, and will be independent of other parts of 
the experiment. 
 
Use the following table for records: 
 Record your Results Here 
Number of Problems Attempted  
Guess About the Number of Problems Correct  
 
PARTS 3-5 
In PARTS 3-5 of the experiment, you will be asked to make a series of choices in decision problems. How 
much you receive will depend partly on chance and partly on the choices you make. 
In each PART, you will see a table with 20 lines. You will state whether you prefer Option A or Option B in 
each line. You should think of each line as a separate decision you need to make. However, only one line in PARTS 
4-6 will be the ‘line that counts’ and will be paid out.  
 At the end of the experiment, we will draw a card from a deck of cards numbered 3, 4, 5. Depending on 
which card is chosen, either PART 3, PART 4, or PART 5 will “count” 
 Then, we will draw a card from a deck of cards numbered 1, 2, ….20. The number on the card chosen 
indicates which line in that part will be paid out 
Because each line is equally likely to be selected, and because you do not know which line will be selected 
when you make your choices, you should pay close attention to the choices you make in each line. In some lines, 
depending on the decisions you make, you may earn up to $10. 
 
PART 3 
For each line in the table, please state whether you prefer option A or option B. Notice that there are a total 
of 20 lines in the table – you should think of each line as a separate decision you need to make.  
Your earnings for the selected line depend on which option you chose: If you chose option B in that line, you 
will receive an amount of money specified by option B – between $0.50 and $10, depending on the line. If you chose 
option A in that line, you will receive either $10 or $0. To determine your earnings in the case you chose option A we 
will randomly draw a ball from a bag containing twenty balls. The balls are either white or orange, but you do not 
know the exact number of white and orange balls before you make your decision. Before you draw the ball you choose 
a color. For example, suppose that you choose white. If the drawn ball is really white, you will receive $10. If the 
drawn ball is orange, you will receive $0. 
While you have all the information in the table, you should input all your 20 decisions into the computer. 
The actual drawing of the ball for this part of the experiment will be determined at the end of the experiment. 
 
Use the following tables for records: 
 Record Your Response Here 
CHOOSE YOUR COLOR: ☐ WHITE ☐ ORANGE 
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Decision 
Number 
Option A Option B 
Choose 
A or B 
1 $10.00 with unknown chance $0.00 with unknown chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$0.50 for sure  
2 $10.00 with unknown chance $0.00 with unknown chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$1.00 for sure  
3 $10.00 with unknown chance $0.00 with unknown chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$1.50 for sure  
4 $10.00 with unknown chance $0.00 with unknown chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$2.00 for sure  
5 $10.00 with unknown chance $0.00 with unknown chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$2.50 for sure 
 6 $10.00 with unknown chance $0.00 with unknown chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$3.00 for sure  
7 $10.00 with unknown chance $0.00 with unknown chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$3.50 for sure  
8 $10.00 with unknown chance $0.00 with unknown chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$4.00 for sure  
9 $10.00 with unknown chance $0.00 with unknown chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$4.50 for sure  
10 $10.00 with unknown chance $0.00 with unknown chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$5.00 for sure 
 11 $10.00 with unknown chance $0.00 with unknown chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$5.50 for sure  
12 $10.00 with unknown chance $0.00 with unknown chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$6.00 for sure  
13 $10.00 with unknown chance $0.00 with unknown chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$6.50 for sure  
14 $10.00 with unknown chance $0.00 with unknown chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$7.00 for sure  
15 $10.00 with unknown chance $0.00 with unknown chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$7.50 for sure  
16 $10.00 with unknown chance $0.00 with unknown chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$8.00 for sure  
17 $10.00 with unknown chance $0.00 with unknown chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$8.50 for sure  
18 $10.00 with unknown chance $0.00 with unknown chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$9.00 for sure  
19 $10.00 with unknown chance $0.00 with unknown chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$9.50 for sure  
20 $10.00 with unknown chance $0.00 with unknown chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$10.00 for sure  
 
PART 4 
For each line in the table, please state whether you prefer option A or option B. Notice that there are a total 
of 20 lines in the table – you should think of each line as a separate decision you need to make.  
Your earnings for the selected line depend on which option you chose: If you chose option B in that line, you 
will receive an amount of money specified by option B – between $0.50 and $10, depending on the line. If you chose 
option A in that line, you will receive either $10 or $0. To determine your earnings in the case you chose option A we 
will randomly draw a ball from a bag containing twenty balls. There are ten orange and ten white balls in the bag. 
That means that when we draw a ball, there is a 50% chance that it is white and a 50% chance that it is orange. Before 
you draw the ball you choose a color. For example, suppose that you choose white. If the drawn ball is really white, 
you will receive $10. If the drawn ball is orange, you will receive $0. 
While you have all the information in the table, you should input all your 20 decisions into the computer. 
The actual drawing of the ball for this part of the experiment will be determined at the end of the experiment. 
 
Use the following tables for records: 
 Record Your Response Here 
CHOOSE YOUR COLOR: ☐ WHITE ☐ ORANGE 
   
Decision 
Number 
Option A Option B 
Choose 
A or B 
1 $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 with 50% chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$0.50 for sure  
2 $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 with 50% chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$1.00 for sure  
3 $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 with 50% chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$1.50 for sure  
4 $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 with 50% chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$2.00 for sure  
5 $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 with 50% chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$2.50 for sure 
 6 $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 with 50% chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$3.00 for sure  
7 $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 with 50% chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$3.50 for sure  
8 $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 with 50% chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$4.00 for sure  
9 $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 with 50% chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$4.50 for sure  
10 $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 with 50% chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$5.00 for sure 
 11 $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 with 50% chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$5.50 for sure  
12 $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 with 50% chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$6.00 for sure  
13 $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 with 50% chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$6.50 for sure  
14 $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 with 50% chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$7.00 for sure  
15 $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 with 50% chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$7.50 for sure  
16 $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 with 50% chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$8.00 for sure  
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17 $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 with 50% chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$8.50 for sure  
18 $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 with 50% chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$9.00 for sure  
19 $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 with 50% chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$9.50 for sure  
20 $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 with 50% chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, 0, 1,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$10.00 for sure  
 
PART 5 
For each line in the table, please state whether you prefer option A or option B. Notice that there are a total 
For each line in the table, please state whether you prefer option A or option B. Notice that there are a total of 20 lines 
in the table – you should think of each line as a separate decision you need to make.  
Your earnings for the selected line depend on which option you chose: If you chose option B in that line, you 
will receive $0. If you chose option A in that line, you can receive either a loss between -$1 and -$20, depending on 
the line, or a gain of $10. To determine your earnings in the case you chose option A we will randomly draw a ball 
from a bag containing twenty balls. There are ten orange and ten white balls in the bag. Before you draw the ball you 
choose a color. For example, suppose that you choose white. If the drawn ball is really white, you will receive -$x (the 
exact amount depends on the line chosen). If the drawn ball is orange, you will receive $10. 
While you have all the information in the table, you should input all your 20 decisions into the computer. 
The actual drawing of the ball for this part of the experiment will be determined at the end of the experiment. 
 
Use the following tables for records: 
 Record Your Response Here 
CHOOSE YOUR COLOR: ☐ WHITE ☐ ORANGE 
 
Decision 
Number 
Option A Option B 
Choose 
A or B 
1 -$1.00 with 50% chance $10.00 with 50% chance 
1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,11,12,13,14
,15,16,17,18,19,20 
$0.00 for sure  
2 -$2.00 with 50% chance $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure  
3 -$3.00 with 50% chance $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure  
4 -$4.00 with 50% chance $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure  
5 -$5.00 with 50% chance $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
 6 -$6.00 with 50% chance $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure  
7 -$7.00 with 50% chance $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure  
8 -$8.00 with 50% chance $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure  
9 -$9.00 with 50% chance $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure  
10 -$10.00 with 50% chance $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
 11 -$11.00 with 50% chance $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure  
12 -$12.00 with 50% chance $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure  
13 -$13.00 with 50% chance $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure  
14 -$14.00 with 50% chance $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure  
15 -$15.00 with 50% chance $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure  
16 -$16.00 with 50% chance $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure  
17 -$17.00 with 50% chance $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure  
18 -$18.00 with 50% chance $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure  
19 -$19.00 with 50% chance $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure  
20 -$20.00 with 50% chance $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure  
 
PART 6 
In this part of the experiment, you will work on your own and have the chance to earn money by solving 2-
digit math problems.  
You will have 2 and a half minutes (150 seconds) for this part. The computer will provide you with up to 30 
math problems (one at a time) that you can attempt to solve during this 2 and a half minutes. Each problem will consist 
of adding 5, two-digit numbers. All of the problems are about the same level of difficulty. You will see the problems 
one at a time and you will not be able to skip any problems. You will not be able to go back to any problems. 
Your earnings for each problem depend on your responses in the following way: 
 For each problem you answer correctly, you will receive $0.50.  
 There is no penalty for incorrect problems, and no earnings from attempted problems that are not correct 
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Answering a problem correctly means that you have provided the correct answer, for example, 2+2=4 is 
correct while 2+2=3 is incorrect. 
The time remaining will be displayed on the overhead. When 2 and a half minutes are up, time will be called. 
You will not be able to respond to any more problems after time is up because your computer will be on pause. After 
time is called, you will need to enter “0” to move on to the outcome screen, and the last problem you answer will not 
count as an attempt. 
The actual earnings for this part of the experiment will be determined at the end of the experiment, and will 
be independent of other parts of the experiment. 
 
PART 7 
In this part of the experiment, you will be asked to provide a guess about how many of the attempted problems 
in Part 6 you solved correctly. You will receive an additional $3 if your guess is equal to the number of correct 
answers that you provided us in Part 6.  
Please enter your guess on your screen. Record your answer (and outcome) below. The actual earnings for 
this part of the experiment will be determined at the end of the experiment, and will be independent of other parts of 
the experiment. 
 
Use the following table for records: 
 Record your Results Here 
Number of Problems Attempted  
Guess About the Number of Problems Correct  
 
Earnings Sheet 
  Result Your Earnings 
PART 1 – Adding Numbers 
Number of Problems Attempted  
 Number of Problems Correct  
Number of Problems Incorrect  
PART 2 – Guessing Game 
Guess About the Number of Problems Correct  
 
Actual Number of Problems Correct  
PARTS 3 - 5 Line Games 
Which Part is Chosen?   ☐ PART 3   ☐ PART 4    ☐ PART 5 
Line that Counts (1-20)  
 
Color Chosen (White or Orange)  
PART 6 – Adding Numbers 
Number of Problems Attempted  
 Number of Problems Correct  
Number of Problems Incorrect  
PART 7 - Guessing Game 
Guess About the Number of Problems Correct  
 
Actual Number of Problems Correct  
TOTAL: $ 
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Appendix B: Additional Information 
 
Table B1: Elicitation of ambiguity aversion preferences 
 
 Option A Option B 
Choice ambiguous option safe option 
# 1 $0.00 or $10.00 with unknown chance $0.50 for sure 
# 2 $0.00 or $10.00 with unknown chance $1.00 for sure 
# 3 $0.00 or $10.00 with unknown chance $1.50 for sure 
# 4 $0.00 or $10.00 with unknown chance $2.00 for sure 
# 5 $0.00 or $10.00 with unknown chance $2.50 for sure 
# 6 $0.00 or $10.00 with unknown chance $3.00 for sure 
# 7 $0.00 or $10.00 with unknown chance $3.50 for sure 
# 8 $0.00 or $10.00 with unknown chance $4.00 for sure 
# 9 $0.00 or $10.00 with unknown chance $4.50 for sure 
# 10 $0.00 or $10.00 with unknown chance $5.00 for sure 
# 11 $0.00 or $10.00 with unknown chance $5.50 for sure 
# 12 $0.00 or $10.00 with unknown chance $6.00 for sure 
# 13 $0.00 or $10.00 with unknown chance $6.50 for sure 
# 14 $0.00 or $10.00 with unknown chance $7.00 for sure 
# 15 $0.00 or $10.00 with unknown chance $7.50 for sure 
# 16 $0.00 or $10.00 with unknown chance $8.00 for sure 
# 17 $0.00 or $10.00 with unknown chance $8.50 for sure 
# 18 $0.00 or $10.00 with unknown chance $9.00 for sure 
# 19 $0.00 or $10.00 with unknown chance $9.50 for sure 
# 20 $0.00 or $10.00 with unknown chance $10.00 for sure 
Participants choose between an ambiguous option A ($0.00 or $10.00 with 
unknown chance) or a safe option B (a certain amount for sure). 
 
 
 
Table B2: Elicitation of risk preferences 
 
 Option A Option B 
Choice ambiguous option safe option 
# 1 -$1.00 or $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 2 -$2.00 or $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 3 -$3.00 or $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 4 -$4.00 or $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 5 -$5.00 or $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 6 -$6.00 or $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 7 -$7.00 or $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 8 -$8.00 or $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 9 -$9.00 or $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 10 -$10.00 or $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 11 -$11.00 or $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 12 -$12.00 or $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 13 -$13.00 or $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 14 -$14.00 or $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 15 -$15.00 or $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 16 -$16.00 or $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 17 -$17.00 or $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 18 -$18.00 or $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 19 -$19.00 or $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 20 -$20.00 or $10.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
Participants choose between a risky option A ($0.00 or $10.00 with 50% chance) 
or a safe option B (a certain amount for sure). 
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Table B3: Elicitation of loss aversion preferences 
 
 Option A Option B 
Choice risky option safe option 
# 1 -$0.50 or $5.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 2 -$1.00 or $5.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 3 -$1.50 or $5.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 4 -$2.00 or $5.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 5 -$2.50 or $5.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 6 -$3.00 or $5.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 7 -$3.50 or $5.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 8 -$4.00 or $5.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 9 -$4.50 or $5.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 10 -$5.00 or $5.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 11 -$5.50 or $5.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 12 -$6.00 or $5.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 13 -$6.50 or $5.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 14 -$7.00 or $5.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 15 -$7.50 or $5.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 16 -$8.00 or $5.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 17 -$8.50 or $5.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 18 -$9.00 or $5.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 19 -$9.50 or $5.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
# 20 -$10.00 or $5.00 with 50% chance $0.00 for sure 
Participants choose between a risky option A (which has 50% chance of 
losing certain amount) or a safe option B ($0.00 for sure). 
 
 
 
Table B4: Correlation between ambiguity, risk and loss-aversion  
 
   Correlations 
Variable Observations Average Ambiguity aversion Risk aversion Loss aversion 
Ambiguity aversion 122 11.69 1   
     [# safe choices]  (3.08)    
Risk aversion 122 10.89 0.67*** 1  
     [# safe choices]  (2.79)    
Loss aversion 122 14.97 0.30*** 0.35*** 1 
     [# safe choices]  (2.95)    
*** significant at 1%; standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table B5: OLS regressions of quantity, with individual treatment dummies 
 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable = Quantity (number attempted) 
Ability 0.26 0.42 0.39 0.28 
  (correct in part 6) (0.30) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26) 
Treatment T-$0.05  2.16 1.54 29.09** 
  (2.45) (2.44) (11.60) 
Treatment T-$0.25  -7.74*** -8.88*** 43.31*** 
  (2.44) (2.46) (13.09) 
Treatment T-$0.50  -7.45*** -8.42*** 25.72* 
  (2.37) (2.38) (13.19) 
Treatment T-$1.00  -11.79*** -11.88*** 31.30*** 
  (2.43) (2.40) (10.89) 
Treatment T-$3.00  -12.45*** -13.44*** 33.60*** 
  (2.50) (2.51) (12.88) 
Loss aversion   0.54** 3.06*** 
   (0.24) (0.63) 
Loss aversion x    -2.05** 
  Treatment T-$0.05    (0.80) 
Loss aversion x    -3.62*** 
  Treatment T-$0.25    (0.87) 
Loss aversion x    -2.48*** 
  Treatment T-$0.50    (0.88) 
Loss aversion x    -3.13*** 
  Treatment T-$1.00    (0.77) 
Loss aversion x    -3.32*** 
  Treatment T-$3.00    (0.87) 
Constant 17.74*** 23.13*** 15.87*** -18.04** 
 (1.96) (2.39) (3.94) (8.74) 
Observations 197 197 197 197 
R-squared 0.13 0.39 0.39 0.43 
** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%; standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table B6: OLS regressions of quality, with individual treatment dummies 
 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable = Quality (number correct) 
Ability 1.51*** 1.48*** 1.49*** 1.54*** 
  (correct in part 6) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) 
Treatment T-$0.05  -0.16 0.06 -9.86** 
  (0.94) (0.94) (4.63) 
Treatment T-$0.25  1.89** 2.29** -13.96*** 
  (0.94) (0.95) (5.23) 
Treatment T-$0.50  2.24** 2.58*** -6.43 
  (0.91) (0.92) (5.26) 
Treatment T-$1.00  3.41*** 3.44*** -6.12 
  (0.94) (0.93) (4.35) 
Treatment T-$3.00  3.58*** 3.92*** -7.19 
  (0.96) (0.97) (5.14) 
Loss aversion   -0.19** -0.87*** 
   (0.09) (0.25) 
Loss aversion x    0.72** 
  Treatment T-$0.05    (0.32) 
Loss aversion x    1.11*** 
  Treatment T-$0.25    (0.35) 
Loss aversion x    0.66* 
  Treatment T-$0.50    (0.35) 
Loss aversion x    0.70** 
  Treatment T-$1.00    (0.31) 
Loss aversion x    0.79** 
  Treatment T-$3.00    (0.35) 
Constant 0.51 -1.14 1.39 10.46*** 
 (0.71) (0.92) (1.52) (3.49) 
Observations 197 197 197 197 
R-squared 0.51 0.58 0.59 0.61 
** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%; standard errors are in parentheses. 
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Table B7: OLS regressions of the error rate, with individual treatment dummies 
 
Specification (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Dependent variable = Error rate (incorrect/attempted) 
Ability -0.05*** -0.04*** -0.04*** -0.05*** 
  (correct in part 6) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Treatment T-$0.05  0.04 0.03 0.58* 
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.33) 
Treatment T-$0.25  -0.19*** -0.21*** 0.94** 
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.37) 
Treatment T-$0.50  -0.20*** -0.22*** 0.27 
  (0.06) (0.07) (0.38) 
Treatment T-$1.00  -0.37*** -0.37*** 0.30 
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.31) 
Treatment T-$3.00  -0.40*** -0.42*** 0.32 
  (0.07) (0.07) (0.37) 
Loss aversion   0.01 0.05*** 
   (0.01) (0.02) 
Loss aversion x    -0.04* 
  Treatment T-$0.05    (0.02) 
Loss aversion x    -0.08*** 
  Treatment T-$0.25    (0.02) 
Loss aversion x    -0.04 
  Treatment T-$0.50    (0.03) 
Loss aversion x    -0.05** 
  Treatment T-$1.00    (0.02) 
Loss aversion x    -0.05** 
  Treatment T-$3.00    (0.02) 
Constant 0.65*** 0.82*** 0.67*** 0.09 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.11) (0.25) 
Observations 197 197 197 197 
R-squared 0.13 0.39 0.39 0.43 
** significant at 5%, *** significant at 1%; standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
 
 
